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DCI
17 Dec 84, 1030

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TALKING POINTS
NSPG on Arms Control
17 December 1984

Let me put on the table three intelligence judgments pertinent to the impending arms talks. The first was put forward in some detail in the briefing [] provided at our first meeting on the Geneva talks, namely that the Soviet strategic doctrine and force structure is such that they are unlikely to agree to reductions significant enough to make our strategic position significantly more secure. That is not to imply that we may not be able to obtain reductions worth getting or that the renewal of the negotiating process should not be energetically pursued for longer range results.

A second intelligence judgment is that the primary objective of the Soviets in these talks will be to stop or blunt the application of our superior technology to develop missile defense. []


[] applying our technology and the negotiating leverage it provides to bring about an evolution of strategic force structure more heavily weighted on defense and less heavily weighted on offensive weapons offers the best prospect of developing a more stable and secure posture for the United States. The Soviets are likely to have as a primary objective in Geneva and subsequent talks influencing Western public opinion to blunt or discard missile defense. Making missile defense part of separate talks on the demilitarization of space rather than as an integral part of negotiations on offensive weapons is likely to play into their hands in this regard. To protect the strategic defense initiative, we will have to justify in public and Congressional opinion that it is necessary for us to work on missile defense to see what it can contribute to long-term strategic stability.

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It would appear that we can more readily do that if the offensive-defensive relationship is addressed together in the same set of negotiations. Putting missile defense together with an ASAT negotiation could run the danger of both attracting too much attention to the sensitive activities which can be exposed in ASAT negotiations and which can be much better protected and controlled in smaller, less conspicuous talks confined solely on restricting ASAT weapons. If defensive missiles are treated together with ASAT space weapons and apart from offensive missiles which do travel in space, the Soviets may well have won the first skirmish in the public diplomacy and propaganda battle, which would turn out to be the most important aspect of these talks.

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